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Symbolic numbers (e.g., ‘‘2’’) acquire their meaning by
becoming linked to the core nonsymbolic quantities they
represent (e.g., two items). However, the extent to
which symbolic and nonsymbolic information converges
onto the same internal core representations of quantity
remains a point of considerable debate. As nearly all
previous work on this topic has employed perceptual
tasks requiring the conscious reporting of numerical
magnitudes, here we question the extent to which
numerical processing via the visual–motor system might
shed further light on the fundamental basis of how
different number formats are encoded. We show, using a
rapid reaching task and a detailed analysis of initial arm
trajectories, that there are key differences in how the
quantity information extracted from symbolic Arabic
numerals and nonsymbolic collections of discrete items
are used to guide action planning. In particular, we found
that the magnitude derived from discrete dots resulted
in movements being biased by an amount directly
proportional to the actual quantities presented whereas

the magnitude derived from numerals resulted in
movements being biased only by the relative (e.g., larger
than) quantities presented. In addition, we found that
initial motor plans were more sensitive to changes in
numerical quantity within small (1–3) than large (5–15)
number ranges, irrespective of their format (dots or
numerals). In light of previous work, our visual–motor
results clearly show that the processing of numerical
quantity information is both format and magnitude
dependent.

Introduction
From clocks to costs to calendars, numbers pervade
our daily life. Central to human cognition (and many of
our technical and mathematical achievements, see
Ansari, 2008; Dehaene, 1997) is our ability to
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accurately represent collections of items (e.g., three
items) as abstract numerical symbols (e.g., ‘‘3’’). One
well-accepted view, perhaps inspired by the tremendous
ease with which we transition between different
numerical formats, argues that the core quantity
derived from a number must be independent of its
format (for reviews, see Ansari, 2008; Nieder &
Dehaene, 2009; Piazza, 2010). Under this view, the
number symbol ‘‘3,’’ the word ‘‘three,’’ and a visual
display containing three items would all map onto the
common underlying number sense of ‘‘three-ness.’’ This
intuitive notion has prompted the development of
several inﬂuential models exploring how this convergent process might occur at the level of neurons
(Dehaene & Changeux, 1993; Verguts & Fias, 2004),
and ﬁndings from human behavior and neuroimaging
showing, respectively, similar reaction times and similar
patterns of brain activity elicited by different numerical
formats of the same magnitude, offer compelling
support for such models (Buckley & Gillman, 1974;
Eger et al., 2009; Gallistel & Gelman, 2000; Moyer &
Landauer, 1967; Piazza, Pinel, Le Bihan, & Dehaene,
2007). However, other theorists argue that neither these
similar patterns of behavior nor brain activity are
necessarily indicative of a format-independent representation of number (for review, see Cohen Kadosh &
Walsh, 2009; for data, see Shuman & Kanwisher,
2004). (Note that when we discuss format-related
differences in numerical processing we refer to the
difference between symbolic and nonsymbolic formats
rather than the different symbolic notations of numerical magnitude, as in Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009).
Recent evidence showing that selective brain areas are
recruited depending on the numerical format of the
display (He, Zuo, Chen, & Humphreys, 2013) offers
particularly compelling support for the notion that the
coding of numerical magnitude in the brain is instead
highly format dependent.
A second dimension along which researchers studying numerical cognition can have dividing opinions is
whether the processing of small numbers (e.g., less than
four) and large numbers (e.g., ﬁve and greater) rely
upon a common underlying numerical estimation
mechanism. Again, evidence here is mixed, with some
perceptual studies suggesting that the numerical estimation of small and large numbers relies on a single
estimation procedure governed by Weber’s law (Dehaene, 2007; Dehaene & Changeux, 1993; Gallistel &
Gelman, 1991; Izard & Dehaene, 2008; Whalen,
Gallistel, & Gelman, 1999), in which the sensitivity of
numerosity discrimination is determined only by the
ratio between numbers. By contrast, other research has
shown dramatic differences in perceptual performance
across the two number ranges in ways that are poorly
accounted for by Weber’s law (Feigenson, Dehaene, &
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Spelke, 2004; Revkin, Piazza, Izard, Cohen, & Dehaene, 2008; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994, see also below).
Further complicating these above distinctions is the
well-documented observation that the dimensions of
format (nonsymbolic vs. symbolic) and number range
(small vs. large) strongly interact. Speciﬁcally, a large
body of ﬁndings, spanning multiple research ﬁelds,
shows that humans (and other animals) possess an
ability to immediately and precisely enumerate small
quantities of items (usually four or less). Depending on
the experimental paradigm, this specialized ability has
been referred to as subitizing (Kaufman, Lord, Reese,
& Volkmann, 1949), object tracking (Pylyshyn &
Storm, 1988), or parallel individuation (Feigenson et
al., 2004) and is thought to strictly apply to small
number magnitudes represented by collections of real
(nonsymbolic) items. Importantly, with collections of
items having more than four objects and for magnitudes expressed symbolically (e.g., the numeral 5),
numerical processing is thought to rely upon a separate
approximate number system (for reviews, see Hyde,
2011; Piazza, 2010).
It is worth recognizing that nearly all previous work
studying the effects of numerical format and magnitude, with a few notable exceptions like studies in
nonverbal infants (e.g., Feigenson & Carey, 2005) and
nonhuman primates (e.g., Hauser, MacNeilage, &
Ware, 1996), has implemented purely visual–perceptual
tasks in which participants are explicitly required to
count, compare, track or recall the numerical magnitudes presented and in which their responses are
measured via discrete measurements (e.g., key presses,
verbal reports). Rather than restricting investigations
of numerical processing to highly visual–perceptual
tasks that require conscious reports, one particularly
intriguing possibility is that the fundamental basis of
the representation of numerical format and magnitude
in the brain can also be probed by capitalizing on the
strong action-associations humans form with numbers.
From a behavioral perspective, we use numbers to
guide both our long-term decisions and our momentto-moment actions; for example, clocks and calendars
are meaningful only in the sense that they may remind
us to perform some action at a speciﬁc time on a
speciﬁc day; the ability to calculate ﬁnancial costs is
relevant only if it is used to guide our future behavior
(e.g., whether or not to purchase an item). Notably, the
intimate link between number and action is not merely
semantic but one that appears to be reﬂected in the
cortical organization of the primate brain: parietal
brain areas that represent numerical quantity and
related processes are close to and often overlapping
with the brain regions that support movement planning-related processes (Knops, Thirion, Hubbard,
Michel, & Dehaene, 2009; e.g., Nieder & Dehaene,
2009; Simon, Mangin, Cohen, Le Bihan, & Dehaene,
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2002; Walsh, 2003). Thus, the ways in which magnitude
information is both used and cortically represented
appear to be directly yoked to the planning of actions
and behavior. This appealing notion has been explored
across a variety of behavioral tasks showing that, in
certain cases, the execution of movements (reaching
and/or grasping) can be indirectly inﬂuenced by
magnitude information presented during the task (e.g.,
Andres, Ostry, Nicol, & Paus, 2008; Fischer &
Campens, 2009; Lindemann, Abolaﬁa, Girardi, &
Bekkering, 2007; Song & Nakayama, 2008).
We recently examined the direct links between action
planning and nonsymbolic numerical processing by
developing a novel behavioral task to determine how
the number of potential targets inﬂuences rapidreaching movements (see Gallivan et al., 2011). In this
manual aiming task, subjects are forced to initiate
speeded arm movements toward multiple potential
targets before one of the targets is cued for action.
Interestingly, we found that initial reach trajectories
were increasingly biased toward the side of the target
display containing more potential targets. Importantly,
however, the presentation of more than four targets
had no further effects on the spatial bias of initial reach
trajectories. Despite the visuomotor system operating
on a time scale faster than that used in perceptual
discrimination, the capacity limit of four targets for
reaching is very similar to the bottleneck often reported
in a wide range of perceptual tasks when subjects are
required to count, track, or recall collections of visually
presented objects (e.g., Kaufman et al., 1949; Luck &
Vogel, 1997; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Revkin et al.,
2008). This previous work suggests that the processes of
action planning, as revealed through time-evolving
reach movements, can yield direct insights into the
fundamental basis of how quantity information is
represented in the brain.
In consideration of ongoing debates concerning the
format-dependent versus -independent and small versus
large processing of number, here we implemented a
novel version of our rapid reaching task to probe the
underlying mechanisms that support the representation
of number in the brain. The current study comprises
two experiments, each of which has two experimental
groups. The ﬁrst experiment had two primary objectives. The ﬁrst of these, explored in one group of
subjects, was to replicate our previous work (Chapman
et al., 2010a; Gallivan et al., 2011) showing that rapid
reaches are sensitive to the magnitude of a small
collection of items (hereafter referred to as nonsymbolic magnitude or dots) and to see if, under identical
timing constraints (requiring very rapid magnitude
processing), this sensitivity would also extend to small
magnitudes expressed by Arabic numerals (hereafter
referred to as symbolic magnitude or numerals). The
second objective of the ﬁrst experiment, explored in a

Downloaded from jov.arvojournals.org on 06/20/2022

3

separate group of subjects, was to see how both
nonsymbolic and symbolic magnitude information
would affect reaching behavior when participants were
given an additional 500 ms of processing time prior to
initiating a rapid reach movement. Overall, the goal of
the ﬁrst experiment was to provide a preliminary
exploration of the effect of numerical format on rapid
reaching and see how planning-related processes might
be inﬂuenced by the time available for processing
symbolic and nonsymbolic magnitudes.
Using the results from the ﬁrst experiment to
mitigate processing time differences across number
formats, the second experiment was designed to address
the two major debates in the literature on numerical
processing. First, can reaching behavior reveal whether
numerical magnitude processing is format dependent
versus independent? Second, can it reveal whether the
processing of small numbers is different than the
processing of large numbers? To this end, in Experiment 2, two separate groups of participants were
instructed to plan reaching movements based on cue
displays containing dots or numerals that were either
within the small number range (1–3; ﬁrst group) or
large number range (5–15; second group). If Arabic
numerals yield the same magnitude information as their
dot counterparts, then reaching performance on dot
and numeral trials should be near identical. If,
however, behavior substantially differs across these two
formats, then it would indicate that the extraction of
quantity information from number symbols fundamentally differs from the extraction of quantity
information from sets of items. Likewise, if reaches
performed towards displays with smaller magnitudes
are different than those performed towards large
magnitudes, then it might indicate a dedicated mechanism for the processing of small magnitudes. Importantly, in order to rule out the possibility that any
differences between small and large number ranges
might simply reﬂect Weber’s law (whereby judgments
become increasingly less precise with increasing magnitudes) the same target ratios in the dot and numeral
cue displays were maintained across both small and
large number ranges.

Materials and methods
Participants
A total of 117 right-handed participants took part in
this study (29 in the Experiment 1 [E1] immediate
group; 28 in the E1 delay group; 30 in the Experiment 2
[E2] small number group; and 30 in the E2 large
number group). Handedness was determined by the
Edinburgh handedness questionnaire (Oldﬁeld, 1971).
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All subjects had normal or corrected-to-normal vision,
and were recruited from the University of Western
Ontario (London, Ontario, Canada). Informed consent
was obtained in accordance with procedures approved
by the University’s Psychology Review Ethics Board
and consistent with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Stringent exclusion criteria ensured that only participants who performed the task with sufﬁcient speed and
accuracy (see General methods information below)
were included for analysis: E1-immediate, N ¼ 20 (after
nine excluded), ﬁve males, average age: 22.4 years; E1delay, N ¼ 19 (after nine excluded), 12 males, average
age: 21.6 years; E2-small, N ¼ 22 (after eight excluded),
nine males, average age: 19.3 years; and E2-large, N ¼
17 (after 13 excluded), eight males, average age: 21.4
years. Each testing session for a participant took ; 1.5
hours. See also Supplementary information.

Overview of experiments
An important consideration we needed to address
was whether different numerical formats require
different amounts of cognitive processing time—
regardless of whether they eventually arrive at a
common representation in the brain (see Cohen
Kadosh & Walsh, 2009). Although the processing
delays inherent in the physical apprehension of a
numerical symbol or a collection of items are not
themselves of particular interest to researchers in
numerical cognition, designing experimental paradigms
that account for these processing delays is necessary for
answering the bigger question of whether the representation of numerical quantity in the brain is format
dependent or independent.
As such, E1 consisted of two experimental groups
that performed trials differing only in timing. The ﬁrst
group, E1-immediate, was required to initiate a reach
movement as soon as a cue display appeared (0-ms
delay). The second group, E1-delay, was provided with
a 500-ms preview of the cue display prior to being
instructed to initiate a reach movement. We implemented a 500-ms delay interval because our recent
work shows that it provides enough processing time in
which to override differences in low-level visual
features of cue displays (Wood et al., 2011) and because
previous work in numerical cognition shows that
numerical symbols most strongly inﬂuence behavior
after 500 ms of processing (Fischer, Castel, Dodd, &
Pratt, 2003). In both E1-immediate and E1-delay the
cue displays contained either dots or numerals of small
quantities (zero, one or two hollow circles on dot
displays and 0, 1, or 2 Arabic numerals on numeral
displays). E2 used a procedure that was identical to the
delay trials from E1 except that we explored quantities
within both the small and large number range. The E2-
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small group were presented with dot and numeral cue
displays consisting of values 1, 2, and 3 whereas the E2large group were presented with dot and numeral cue
displays consisting of values 5, 10, and 15.

General methods information
We recorded rapid reach movements (index ﬁnger of
right hand at sampling rate of 150 Hz, OPTOTRAK)
from participants as they reached to a touch screen (40cm reach distance, 32-in. screen at 1024 · 768 pixel
resolution, 60-Hz refresh rate). Participants began each
trial with their right index ﬁnger pressing a button at
the starting location. Following presentation of a
ﬁxation cross (1000–2000 ms), Arabic numerals or dot
targets (unﬁlled circles), in separate blocks of trials,
were displayed on the left, right, or both sides of the
touch screen. In the E1-immediate group, a beep cuing
subjects to initiate a reach occurred simultaneously
with the cue-display onset (0-ms delay). Since reaction
times for this group were ; 235 ms (see Supplemental
material for full analysis), this meant they had ; 235
ms to process the cue prior to reach onset. For the E1delay, E2-small, and E2-large groups, the beep cuing
them to initiate a reach occurred 500 ms after cuedisplay onset. For the E1-delay group, reaction times
were ; 235 ms and for both the E2 groups, reaction
times were ; 230 ms (see Supplemental material for
full analysis), meaning that with the 500-ms delay we
introduced, these groups had ; 730–735 ms total time
to process the cue prior to reach onset. Upon initiation
of a reach to touch the screen with their ﬁnger (within
325 ms of the beep cue) and the start button’s release,
the dot and numeral displays were brieﬂy (;17 ms)
replaced by a blank white screen and then replaced with
a dot display where one of the target circles was ﬁlled in
with black. Subjects had to correct their trajectory in
ﬂight and touch the screen at the location of the ﬁlled
target (within 425 ms). Critically, in the numeral blocks
(as well as dot blocks), when the initial display was
replaced with a dot display, there was direct correspondence between the initial magnitude and the
subsequent number of dots. That is, if the cue display
had, for example, 1 (or one dot) on the left and 2 (or
two dots) on the right then the target display would
have one dot on the left and two on the right. Thus, the
only difference between numeral and dot trials was the
format of the quantity information presented in the
initial cue display. Importantly, all targets in the target
display always had an equal probability of ﬁlling in. As
such, in both dot and numeral blocks, optimal
performance required consideration of the initial
quantity information contained in the cue display
during movement planning. See Figure 1 and
supplemental video for timing details.
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Figure 1. Illustration of the task (a), timing (b), and subjects’ average arm trajectory (c). (a) Display sequence for a single trial in
numeral (see top) and dot (see below) blocks. Note, in the E1-immediate group the beep cuing subject to initiate a reach occurred
simultaneously with the cue-display onset (0-ms delay), while in the E1-delay group and E2-small and E2-large groups, the beep cuing
them to initiate a reach occurred 500 ms after the cue-display onset. Critically, in the numeral blocks, when the initial display was
replaced with a dot display, there was direct correspondence between the initial numeral magnitude and the subsequent number of
dots. As such, the only difference between numeral and dot trials was the format of the quantity information in the initial cue display.
All targets in the target display always had an equal probability of filling in. The diagram (b) below the displays in (a) illustrates the
linkage between the participant’s movement and the onset of the target display. (c) The three-dimensional view of the experimental
setup shows reach trajectories for example dot displays (shown at right) averaged across 20 subjects from the immediate group in E1.
Baseline trials (single target) are shown for illustrative purposes only and are analyzed in the Supplemental material. When targets
appeared on both the left and the right, the cue could be on either side of the display; in the examples shown here, the color coding
indicates the side of the display on which the cue appeared. Shaded areas around the darker trajectories (traces) represent average
standard errors; the darkened ovals indicate 25%, 50%, and 75% of movement distance, and their size is proportional to the velocity
in the x, y, and z dimensions (colors are for purposes of illustration only).

To ensure rapid and accurate movements, participants received performance feedback on the touch
screen following each trial. There were four possible
types of errors which caused the following text to be
displayed on the touch screen: ‘‘Too Early’’ (if the start
button was released before 100 ms had elapsed; this
aborted the trial), ‘‘Time Out’’ (if the start button was
not released within 325 ms following the beep cue; this
aborted the trial), ‘‘Too Slow’’ (if the screen was not
touched within 425 ms of button-release), or ‘‘Miss’’ (if
subjects did not touch within a 6 cm · 6 cm box
centered on the ﬁnal target). ‘‘Good’’ was displayed on
trials without errors. Trials that were too early, time
out, or miss were removed from analysis, as were the
slowest too slow trials (slowest 5% across all participants in an experiment). The remaining good and too
slow trials were therefore analyzed. A participant was
excluded if, after this trial removal, they had less than
four analyzable trials in each experimental condition
(i.e., for every target display for both dot and numeral
trials, see Materials and methods). See the
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Supplemental material for information about trial and
participant screening.

General analysis information
We were speciﬁcally interested in the movements
planned in response to the cue display, since this is the
only point in the trial sequence where the dot and
numeral trials differed. Therefore, to isolate a measure
of the reach response that was governed only by
viewing of the cue display (and not contaminated by
changes in the display encountered at reach onset), we
focused our analysis on the trajectory deviation
observed at 100 ms post-reach onset (corresponding to
;70 mm of reach distance in all experiments). Since the
target display did not actually appear until ; 17 ms
after the onset of the movement (due to the blank
screen refresh of the monitor) this means that our
analysis was actually centered on early trajectory
differences arising at ; 83 ms following target-display
onset. This particular time point was chosen for
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analysis because it precedes the time in which sensory
processing associated with the display change can
possibly affect the movement trajectory. At the neural
level, it takes ; 90 ms for a change in visual
information to even reach visuomotor structures in
posterior parietal cortex (e.g., Mulliken, Musallam, &
Andersen, 2008), one of the ﬁrst sites where visual
information can actually start to affect goal-directed
action. In addition, at the behavioral level, the delay in
involuntary motor corrections in response to changes in
visual stimuli (including in-ﬂight trajectory corrections)
is around 110–150 ms (e.g., Brenner & Smeets, 1997;
Day & Lyon, 2000; Franklin & Wolpert, 2008; Saijo,
Murakami, Nishida, & Gomi, 2005), explaining why
the early portion of a rapid reach movement is ballistic
and based only on visual information accumulated
prior to reach onset. In sum, an analysis of movement
trajectories at 100 ms post-reach onset will only reveal
biases in the initial motor plan based on the cue display
and cannot reﬂect changes in the display that occur at
reach onset.

Experiment 1 methods
Participants performed 12 experimental blocks with
48 trials per block. The block type alternated between
dot and numeral blocks such that each block type
appeared six times. The ﬁrst block type was counterbalanced across participants and the ﬁrst block of each
type was used as training and was not included in
analysis (this yielded 240 analyzed dot and numeral
trials each, see the Supplemental material for
additional information regarding trial and participant
screening).

Experiment 1 analyses
To characterize the bias induced by numerical
magnitude (across both formats) for each participant
we calculated the lateral deviation difference between
mirror-imaged displays (e.g., the lateral deviation
difference between a participant’s average trajectory
when reaching toward a 1v2 display and their average
trajectory when reaching toward a 2v1 display). We
have previously shown that this analysis of trajectory
differences between reaches toward mirror displays
yields the most sensitive measure of a reach biases
induced by the cue displays (Chapman et al., 2010a).
Our E1 analysis was designed to answer two main
questions: (a) whether a given condition (combination
of format and processing time) yielded a signiﬁcant
magnitude bias in reach trajectories and (b) what the
relative effects of format and processing time would be.
To address the ﬁrst question, for each of the four
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conditions, we conducted a t test of lateral deviation
difference at 100 ms against zero. A signiﬁcant result
indicates sensitivity to magnitude in that condition. To
address the second question we conducted a 2 (Format:
Dot versus Numeral) · 2 (Processing Time: Immediate
versus Delay) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA,
repeated measures on format, between participants on
processing time) on the lateral deviation differences
(1v2 – 2v1 as described above) between trajectories at
100 ms. Repeated measures ANOVA results are
reported with the Greenhouse-Geisser correction applied.

Experiment 1 results
The results for Experiment 1 are depicted in Figure 2
where we show the average reach trajectories generated
by both the immediate (Figure 2a, b) and delay (Figure
2c, d) groups for both dot (Figure 2a, c) and numeral
(Figure 2b, d) blocks. The results from the t tests
assessing magnitude sensitivity can be seen visually in
Figure 2e where the error bars represent the 95%
conﬁdence intervals for that difference relative to zero.
As can be seen, for the immediate group (Figure 2e, left
bars), only the dot difference (green bar) was signiﬁcantly larger than zero, t(19) ¼ 2.88, p , 0.01, whereas
the numeral difference (gray bar) was not, t(19) ¼ 0.73,
p . 0.47. However, for the delay group (Figure 2e,
right bars), both the dot, t(18) ¼ 5.38, p , 0.01, and
numeral differences, t(18) ¼ 4.85, p , 0.01, were larger
than zero. Thus, this analysis demonstrated that in the
immediate condition only dots resulted in a bias of
reaches to the side of space with the higher magnitude,
whereas in the delay condition, the 500-ms preview was
sufﬁcient such that both dots and numerals resulted in
a bias of reaches toward the higher magnitude.
The results from the mixed ANOVA revealed a
marginally signiﬁcant interaction between format and
processing time, F(1, 37) ¼ 3.97, p ¼ 0.054. To further
explore this, we conducted comparisons of dot and
numeral performance across the immediate and delay
groups. We found that the dot difference was not
signiﬁcant, t(37) ¼ 0.49, p . 0.6, whereas the numeral
difference was marginally signiﬁcant, t(37) ¼ 2.14, p ¼
0.04. The ANOVA interaction between format and
processing time suggests that these two formats may
not be inﬂuencing reach behavior identically. The
second experiment in this study was speciﬁcally
designed to further test for this intriguing possibility.

Experiment 2 methods
E2 implemented a protocol that was identical to that
of E1-delay with the exception that we now explored
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Figure 2. Results from E1. Mean reach trajectories for target ratios 2v1 (blue) and 1v2 (red) for both dot (a), (c) and numeral (b), (d)
blocks in the immediate (a), (b) and delay (c), (d) groups. Results are shown for trials on which targets on the right were cued. The
bars, shown in (e), denote the difference between the red and blue (red–blue) trajectory traces for dot (shown in green) and numeral
(shown in black) blocks (i.e., the difference in lateral deviation between displays with more targets on the right and displays with
more targets on the left) for trials on which targets on both the right and left were cued, plotted at a time point 100 ms post-reach
onset (;70 mm of reach distance). Error bars show 95% confidence intervals and, when the lower boundary is greater than zero, they
denote that differences diverged significantly ( p , 0.05). Colors are for purposes of illustration only.

quantities within the small (1–3) and large (5–15)
number range. Again, we ran two experimental groups:
(a) a small-number group (E2-small) that encountered
displays with values 1, 2, and 3; and (b) a large-number
group (E2-large) that encountered displays with values
5, 10, and 15. To keep the number of different display
types manageable, one side of the cue display always
had a constant number of targets, either one target (on
dot blocks) or the numeral 1 (on numeral blocks) for
the small-number group or ﬁve targets or the numeral 5
for the large-number group. By keeping the number of
targets on one side of the display constant, we were able
to directly measure shifts in the incremental bias of
initial reach trajectories as the number of targets
increased from one (1) to two (2) to three (3) for the
small number group and from ﬁve (5) to ten (10) to
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ﬁfteen (15) for the large number group (for a similar
parametric design, see Gallivan et al., 2011). To
appreciate how the cue displays on numeral blocks and
dot blocks compare, see Figure 3 (note that Figure 3
also denotes how on numeral blocks the numeral cue
displays would have been subsequently replaced, at
movement onset, with the corresponding dot display).
Both the small-number group and the large-number
group ran twelve 52-trial blocks (alternating between
dots and numerals). The ﬁrst block type was counterbalanced across participants, and the ﬁrst block of each
type was used as training and was not included in
analysis (this yielded 260 analyzed dot and numeral
trials each, see the Supplemental material for
additional information regarding trial and participant
screening).
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Figure 3. Parameters for dot and numeral cue displays in E2. Top row shows the cue-display parameters of a 1v3 trial for the dot
display (left), numeral display (middle), and their overlap (right), for the sake of comparison. Bottom row shows the cue-display
parameters of a 5v10 trial for the dot display (left), numeral display (middle), and their overlap (right). Gray outlined circles denote all
possible target locations that could be displayed on a given trial whereas black outlined circles denote the potential targets for the
example trial.

Experiment 2 analyses
We used the same dependent measure of reaching as
described in the ﬁrst experiment—that is, a measure of
the lateral position of the hand 100 ms after reach
onset. We again calculated biases induced by magnitude by taking the lateral differences between trajectories produced in different conditions. For this
experiment we used an analysis that took advantage of
our parametric design and calculated three key
differences. Since we will include these differences as a
factor in an analysis that can collapse across format, we
will refer to them as ratio differences, which were
preserved across number ranges. The ﬁrst ratio
difference is a single-unit increase in the quantity of the
item opposite the constant value, comparing reaching
toward 1v1 and 1v2 displays (small number group,
where a single-unit increase of one occurs opposite the
constant value) and 5v5 and 5v10 displays (large
number group, where a single-unit increase of ﬁve
occurs opposite the constant value). The second ratio
difference is a double-unit increase in the quantity
opposite the constant value, comparing reaching
toward 1v1 displays and 1v3 displays (small number
group, where a double-unit increase of two occurs
opposite the constant value) and 5v5 and 5v15 displays
(large number group, where a double-unit increase of
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10 occurs opposite the constant value). Finally, the
third ratio difference is again a single-unit increase in
the quantity opposite the constant value, comparing
reaching toward 1v2 and 1v3 displays (small number
group, where a single-unit increase of one occurs
opposite the constant value) and 5v10 and 5v15
displays (large number group, where a single-unit
increase of ﬁve occurs opposite the constant value). To
differentiate between the two single-unit ratio differences, we will refer to the ﬁrst ratio difference (e.g., 1v1
to 1v2) as single-unit low and the third ratio difference
(e.g., 1v2 to 1v3) as single-unit high. An analysis of
these ratio differences allows an examination of how
the trajectory bias changes across the three levels of
magnitude increase. Importantly, we can then determine how these ratio differences compare in both the
dot blocks and the numeral blocks and in the small and
large number range (i.e., speciﬁcally testing for format
and number-range effects in the trajectory data).
Similar to E1, our E2 analysis had two primary
objectives: ﬁrst, to determine whether a given condition (combination of format, ratio difference, and
number range) yielded a signiﬁcant magnitude bias in
reach trajectories and second, to determine what the
relative effects of format and ratio difference would be
across both the small- and large-number groups. To
address the ﬁrst question, we again employed t tests of
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Figure 4. Results from E2. Results from the E2 small-number (a)–(c) and large-number (d)–(f) groups. The graphs in (a)–(b) show mean
reach trajectories for target ratios 3v1, 2v1, 1v1, 1v2, and 1v3 for both dot (a) and numeral (b) experimental blocks. Results are shown
for trials on which targets on the right were cued. (c) Left set of bars show the average difference between the single-unit-low trials
for trials on which targets on both the right and left were cued, plotted at a time point 100 ms post-reach onset (;70 mm of reach
distance); that is, red from black (red–black) and blue from black (blue–black) trajectory traces. Middle set of bars show the average
difference between double-unit trials for trials on which targets on both the right and left were cued, plotted for the same time point;
that is, the pink from black (pink–black) and cyan from black (cyan–black) trajectory traces. Right set of bars show the average
difference between the single-unit-high trials for trials on which targets on both the right and left were cued, plotted for the same
time point; that is, the pink from red (pink–red) and cyan from blue (cyan–blue) trajectory traces. Error bars show 95% confidence
intervals and, when above zero, denote that differences significantly ( p , 0.05) diverged. The graphs in (d)–(e) show mean reach
trajectories for target ratios 15v5, 10v5, 5v5, 5v10, and 5v15 for both dot (d) and numeral (e) experimental blocks. Results are shown
for trials on which targets on the right were cued. (f) Bar plots and associated confidence intervals are computed and shown the same
as in (c). Colors are for purposes of illustration only.

lateral deviation difference at 100 ms against zero. To
address the second question, we conducted a 2
(Number Range: Small or Large) · 2 (Format: Dot or
Numeral) · 3 (Ratio Difference: Single-Unit Low,
Double-Unit, Single-Unit High) mixed ANOVA
(repeated measures on format and ratio difference,
between participants on number range) on the lateral
deviation difference at 100 ms.

Experiment 2 results
The results from E2 can be seen in Figure 4 where we
show the average reach trajectories generated by both
the small-number (Figure 4a, b) and large-number
(Figure 4d, e) groups for both dot (Figure 4a, d) and
numeral (Figure 4b, e) blocks. The results of the t tests
examining magnitude sensitivity are again visualized
using 95% conﬁdence intervals of each difference

Downloaded from jov.arvojournals.org on 06/20/2022

relative to zero (see Figure 4c, f). For the small-number
group, the single-unit low and double-unit ratio
differences are signiﬁcantly larger than zero for both
the dot, single-unit low: t(21) ¼ 4.40, p , 0.01, doubleunit: t(21) ¼ 7.27, p , 0.01, and numeral, single-unit
low: t(21) ¼ 7.29, p , 0.01; double-unit: t(21) ¼ 6.53, p
, 0.01, blocks. Importantly, however, for the smallnumber group and the single-unit high ratio difference,
only the dot, t(21) ¼ 3.77, p , 0.01, and not the
numeral, t(21) ¼ 0.83, p . 0.42, difference shows
magnitude sensitivity. Strikingly, the identical pattern
of results is seen for the large-number group. Again, the
single-unit low and double-unit ratio differences are
signiﬁcantly larger than zero for both the dot, singleunit low: t(16) ¼ 2.88, p , 0.05, double-unit: t(16) ¼
4.06, p , 0.01, and numeral, single-unit low: t(16) ¼
4.15, p , 0.01; double-unit: t(16) ¼ 3.26, p , 0.01,
blocks, while only the dot, t(16) ¼ 2.52, p , 0.05, and
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not the numeral, t(16) ¼ 0.55, p . 0.58, block shows
sensitivity for the single-unit high comparison.
Together, these results indicate that when planning
motor behavior, magnitude representation is format
dependent in both the small and large number range.
Speciﬁcally, in dot displays, as the number of items
opposite a constant value increased from one to three
for the small-number group (Figure 4a) and from ﬁve
to 15 for the large-number group (Figure 4d), there was
a graded increase in the initial trajectory bias toward
that side of space (in accordance with the probabilistic
distribution of targets). In the dot displays for example,
not only was the initial trajectory more biased in the
2v1 and 10v5 conditions than the 1v1 and 5v5
conditions (single-unit low), it was also more biased in
the 3v1 and 15v5 conditions than the 2v1 and 10v5
conditions (single-unit high). Strikingly, however, for
numeral displays in both the small (Figure 4b) and
large (Figure 4e) number groups, we found a ‘‘winnertake-all’’ response where the initial trajectories were
biased by the same extent toward the larger numeral,
regardless of the actual quantity it represented (i.e.,
whether it was a 2 or 3 or a 10 or 15, resulting in the
null numeral bias we see in the single-unit high results).
The results of the mixed ANOVA conﬁrm and
extend these t test results. There are three signiﬁcant
results derived from this ANOVA and each is
informative. First, we ﬁnd a main effect between our
two experimental groups, F(1, 37) ¼ 5.67, p , 0.05.
Here, the overall trajectory biases generated in the
small-number range are larger than the biases generated in the large-number range. Given that this is the
only signiﬁcant effect involving number range (i.e.,
number range does not interact with format or pair
difference) it could suggest that there is a specialized
system for processing small numbers, regardless of their
format. We explore this and other explanations in the
discussion.
The second effect is a signiﬁcant main effect of pair
difference, F(1.29, 47.59) ¼ 40.34, p , 0.01. Here, the
results follow expectation, with the largest bias (5.17
mm) found for the pairs containing the largest
differences (i.e., double unit) and a smaller bias found
for the pairs containing the smallest difference (i.e.,
single-unit low: 4.40 mm, single-unit high: 0.78 mm, all
Bonferroni corrected pairwise comparisons p , 0.05).
In addition, we also see evidence, consistent with the
Weber fraction, that equivalent magnitude differences
are less salient at the higher end of a range of numbers.
That is, there was a signiﬁcant pair-wise difference in
trajectory deviation between our single-unit low and
single-unit high ratios (Bonferroni corrected p , 0.05).
This means that the difference of one (opposite the
constant value of one in the small number group) and
the difference of ﬁve (opposite the constant value of ﬁve
in the large number group) was more salient (leading to
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larger reach biases) when moving from one to two
targets (i.e., 1v1 compared to 1v2, single-unit low) and
from ﬁve to 10 targets (i.e., 5v5 compared to 5v10,
single-unit low) than it was when moving from two to
three targets (i.e., 1v2 compared to 1v3, single-unit
high) or 10 to 15 targets (i.e., 5v10 compared to 5v15
single-unit high).
The third and most important effect is a signiﬁcant
interaction between format and pair-difference, F(1.11,
41.17) ¼ 14.16, p , 0.01, indicating that the format of
the numerical magnitude is having very different effects
across both the small and large number range.
Speciﬁcally, Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc tests show
that for the single-unit-low pairs, the dot difference is
signiﬁcantly smaller than the numeral difference, t(38)
¼ 3.33, p , 0.01. For the double-unit pairs, there is no
difference between the dot and numeral difference,
t(38) ¼ 0.037, p . 0.9. Finally, for the single-unit high
pairs the dot difference is signiﬁcantly larger than the
numeral difference, t(38) ¼ 4.23, p , 0.01. This pattern
is exactly what is predicted if the dot trajectory
response is graded while the numeral response is winner
take all. That is, as one moves from one set of dots to
twice as many dots to three times as many dots
opposite a constant value, we ﬁnd a gradual increase in
bias. However, as one moves from one numeral value
to a numeral value with twice the magnitude to a
numeral value with three times the magnitude opposite
a constant value, we ﬁnd strong biases to the larger
numeral value, regardless of its magnitude.

General discussion
In this study we used a modiﬁed version of a recently
developed rapid reaching task (see Chapman et al.,
2010a, 2010b; Milne et al., 2013; Wood et al., 2011) to
test whether the quantity information derived from
different number formats (nonsymbolic dots versus
symbolic Arabic numerals) would be used to guide the
planning of motor movements in the same way. Across
two experiments and four different experimental
groups, we provide deﬁnitive evidence that the extraction of magnitude information for the purposes of
behavior is highly format dependent. That is, the
quantity information conveyed through dot and
numeral displays biases planning-related processes in
signiﬁcantly different ways. In E1 we demonstrate
format-dependent timing differences in the ability of
individuals to use magnitude information, with dot
information reliably being used immediately and with
numeral information only reliably being used following
a brief delay of 500 ms. Once these timing differences
were accounted for in E2, we then found that formatdependent processing of quantity extended to both the

Journal of Vision (2014) 14(3):30, 1–19

Chapman et al.

11

Figure 5. Hypothesized descriptive model explaining why the extraction of numerical quantity information differs between numerical
formats and small and large number displays. See text for detailed descriptions.

small-number (e.g., 1–3) and large-number (e.g., 5–15)
ranges. We also observed, quite unexpectedly, that
individuals, as revealed through their initial reach
trajectory biases, were more sensitive to changes in
numerical quantity within small (1–3) than large (5–15)
number ranges, regardless of their format. Here we
discuss each of these key ﬁndings in light of how visual
information about magnitude, derived from different
formats, is used to guide the planning of actions at
different exposure times. Then, after establishing this
timeline, we attempt to consolidate our ﬁndings within
the general framework of a descriptive model (depicted
in Figure 5).

Initial effects of visual onset of the cue display
(0-ms delay)
The ﬁrst major ﬁnding of the present study, revealed
in E1, is that only nonsymbolic (dot) information is
immediately available to the visuomotor system (as
evidenced by biases in the initial reach trajectories, see
Figure 2). This was not an entirely unexpected result,
given that previous researchers in the ﬁeld have argued
that different numerical formats—regardless of their
eventual encoding (abstract vs. nonabstract)—necessitate different amounts of initial processing time (see
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Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009). What we believe is
more important, however, is that the immediate
availability of nonsymbolic magnitude information is
restricted to items within the small number range. In a
previous study we showed, using a task that directly
matches the timing of the E1-immediate condition, that
reach trajectories were increasingly biased toward the
side of the display containing more dot targets up to a
limit of about four (see Gallivan et al., 2011). Any dot
increases beyond this range, however, resulted in no
additional increases in the trajectory bias. This was the
case even when we increased the number of dots
contained on one side of the display up to eight (in one
experiment) and even 16 (in a second experiment). In
light of the current and previous ﬁndings, the ﬁrst aim
of our descriptive model (expanded upon further
below) will be to account for why small nonsymbolic
magnitudes are immediately available to the systems
involved in action planning in a way that larger
nonsymbolic magnitudes simply are not.

Effects of additional cue-display processing time
(500-ms delay)
A second major ﬁnding of the present study, revealed
in E2, is that magnitude information derived both from
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large numbers of nonsymbolic dots and from symbolic
numerals also becomes available to the visuomotor
system following additional cue-display processing time
(as evidence by biases in initial reach trajectories, see
Figure 4). However, as comparisons between the two
groups of E2 show, exactly how this information is
used to plan movement fundamentally differs depending of the numerical format of the display (dots vs.
numerals). Speciﬁcally, we found that reaching toward
displays with dots resulted in incremental increases in
the trajectory bias towards the side of the display with
more dots. For example, in the group of participants
exposed to small numbers (1–3), as the number of dots
on one side of the screen (opposite a constant target
with a value of 1) increased from one to two to three,
the trajectory was biased less toward one, more toward
two, and the most toward three. In striking contrast,
reaching toward displays with numerals resulted in a
winner-take-all trajectory bias. That is, as the numeral
value opposite the constant target increased from 1 to 2
to 3 there was a large increase in trajectory bias from 1
to 2 but no additional increase as the numeral value
increased from 2 to 3. Perhaps most importantly, in the
second group of participants in Experiment 2, we show
that the identical pattern of results holds for larger
numbers with the exact same target ratios. That is, we
show a graded increase in reach trajectory bias (albeit
less than that found for the corresponding small
number displays, as discussed further below) as the
number of dots is increased from ﬁve to 10 to 15 and a
winner-take-all trajectory bias when the same magnitude is conveyed by the numerals 5, 10, and 15.
Taken together, these 0-ms and 500-ms results
require our descriptive model to account for two
important features of the data. First, with reference to
our previous work that reported a capacity limit of
approximately four dot targets (Gallivan et al., 2011,
see our discussion above), why is the magnitude
information extracted from a large number of dots (ﬁve
or higher) only available after a 500-ms delay while the
magnitude information extracted from a small number
of dots (four or less) is available immediately? Second,
how does the extraction of magnitude information
from nonsymbolic dot displays differ from that of
symbolic numeral displays, leading to the numerical
format differences observed across both the small and
large number ranges?
A last major ﬁnding of the present study, also
revealed in E2, is that the biases in reaching induced by
small magnitude displays (1–3) were signiﬁcantly larger
than the biases induced by large magnitude displays (5–
15), irrespective of both the number format (dots vs.
numerals) and the fact that the same target ratios were
controlled across both experimental groups (this effect
was manifest as a signiﬁcant group difference). We
suspect that this small-number magnitude sensitivity,
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although quite unexpected for the symbols displays,
may be tightly linked to the dedicated mechanisms
thought to underlie the parallel individuation of small
nonsymbolic numerosities, as described above (for
example, see also Kaufman et al., 1949; Luck & Vogel,
1997; Pylyshyn & Storm, 1988; Revkin et al., 2008, for
other similar small-set size effects). To the extent that
smaller numerals (1, 2, and 3) had a greater inﬂuence
on initial reach trajectories than their larger numeral
counterparts (5, 10, and 15), this suggests that the
representation of small numerals must be inﬂuenced by
or perhaps rely upon the mechanisms supporting
parallel individuation (a notion that has generated a
great deal of debate, for reviews, see Le Corre & Carey,
2007; Piazza, 2010). Note, however, as detailed in the
descriptive model below, that for this to be true,
numerals and nonsymbolic dots need not share a
common route to effecting action (indeed, our data
strongly suggests the contrary, given that we found
substantial differences depending on number format in
the small number range). Rather, we only intend to
suggest that perhaps through excessive exposure,
learning, and rehearsal, small-number numerals may
take on some of the specialized characteristics of the
speciﬁc set sizes they represent (we expand upon this
notion further below).

Descriptive model of numerical magnitude
extraction
Motivation for the model
Before delving into the key theoretical details of our
descriptive model, we ﬁrst consider why a rapid motor
task appears particularly well suited to identifying the
format- and magnitude-dependent nature of numerical
processing. When vision is used to guide real-time
behavior it is thought to selectively extract those visual
features linked to the real-world physical properties of
objects (size, shape, density, etc.) in the environment
(Goodale & Milner, 1992). In this way, the quantity
information conveyed by a collection of discrete items
(e.g., dots) can be thought of as an immediate visual
property of that collection (in fact, visual features other
than quantity have been shown to also inﬂuence
magnitude estimates, Gebuis & Reynvoet, 2012). By
contrast, the magnitude information conveyed by a
single numerical symbol is cognitively removed from
the visual immediacy of an actual set of items. That is, a
numeral is a single visual item that, although representative of a particular magnitude, cannot be deconstructed into the visual/physical properties of the
magnitude it represents (e.g., the numeral 3 bears no
visual relation to its physical counterpart, three
individual items). Thus, at the level of object feature
processing for action, it seems rather intuitive that a
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visuomotor task be used to investigate numerical
format differences.
Providing a ﬁrst proof-of-principle for this idea, we
have shown elsewhere (Gallivan et al., 2011) that the
immediate extraction of quantity information from
nonsymbolic displays is intimately tied to the welldocumented basic visual capacity of object enumeration or parallel individuation (i.e., up to ; four items), a
bottleneck often linked to our ability to distribute
attention to multiple locations across space (Bays &
Husain, 2008; Hyde & Spelke, 2011). The real-world
observation that spatial attention appears closely
coupled to overt action processes (e.g., eye movements,
reaches, grasps, etc.) has prompted several theoretical
frameworks to unite spatial attention and movement
planning processes in the explanation of goal-directed
motor behavior (Baldauf & Deubel, 2010; Bisley &
Goldberg, 2010; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Moore,
Armstrong, & Fallah, 2003; Rizzolatti, Riggio, Dascola, & Umilta, 1987). Several variants of this general
framework argue that behaviorally relevant objects in
our environment compete in parallel for action
selection, forming complex attentional landscapes or
salience maps with hills of neural activity forming at the
locations of these objects in space (Bisley & Goldberg,
2010; Fecteau & Munoz, 2006; Gottlieb, 2002; Gottlieb, Kusunoki, & Goldberg, 1998). Perhaps not
coincidentally, the types of location maps proposed by
theories of nonsymbolic magnitude processing and
implemented by the neuronal models (Dehaene &
Changeux, 1993; Verguts & Fias, 2004) look like and
function very similarly to the location maps denoting
objects of behavioral relevance, as used by the
theoretical frameworks that unite spatial attention and
movement planning processes. Taken together, it seems
quite likely that this basic parallel individuation system,
and by extension the numerical processing of nonsymbolic items, may be evolutionarily rooted in the more
primitive mechanisms that support rapid reﬂexive
motor planning and behavior (see also Dehaene &
Changeux, 1993, for a similar suggestion). This notion
is in line with the basic capacities of nonsymbolic
numerical processing (i.e., up to ; four items) observed
in semifree-ranging monkeys (Hauser, Carey, & Hauser, 2000) and preverbal infants (Feigenson et al., 2004),
who both lack symbol manipulation capabilities. In
contrast, it is clear that symbolic number processing
and manipulation requires far more advanced cognitive
mechanisms (e.g., additional top-down connections)
allowing the formation of more abstract associations
(via prefrontal cortex, see Nieder, 2009; Nieder &
Dehaene, 2009) and perhaps also the development (or
evolution) of distinct brain areas in the human visual
system (Shum et al., 2013), both of which are not likely
to fall within the evolutionary purview of early
visuomotor structures.
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Explanation of the model
Building on this understanding of the potential links
between parallel individuation and the location maps
thought to underlie the encoding of behaviorally
relevant objects and basic enumeration capacities, we
now turn to the speciﬁc details of our descriptive
model. This model extends the framework and employs
the terminologies put forward in two predominant
neural models of number encoding (Dehaene &
Changeux, 1993; Verguts & Fias, 2004) and, as
suggested above, is intended to unify models using
location maps as a precursor for basic enumeration and
as an index of behaviorally relevant objects. We
accomplish the latter by proposing here that there is
only one location map and it serves both purposes
(action planning and object enumeration). It is worth
noting that this model seeks only to extend these
previous frameworks so as to account for the empirical
data we present here and have found previously
(Gallivan et al., 2011). As such, it does not, of course,
capture the true complexity of visual processing, but
might help in clarifying our theoretical understanding
of magnitude processing and its link to motor control.
Recall that the results of our study demand that at
least four questions be addressed by our descriptive
model:
1. Why is the quantity information contained in smallnumber nonsymbolic cue displays available immediately to guide action?
2. Why is more processing time required to extract
large-number nonsymbolic magnitudes?
3. Why is more processing time required to extract
numeral magnitudes (regardless of number range)?
4. Why do we observe a larger reach bias generated by
small numbers as compared to large numbers,
regardless of their format?
To answer these questions and consolidate our
understanding of the purpose of a location map, we
propose that visual stimuli in most circumstances are
represented in at least three distinct, temporally
separated, stages: (a) as they are processed in space, (b)
as their magnitude/quantity is extracted, and (c) as they
are semantically linked to an abstract quantity. We
refer to these three stages as a location map,
summation code, and abstract number ﬁeld, respectively, in order to most closely align descriptions of our
model with previous terminology put forward by others
(Dehaene & Changeux, 1993; Verguts & Fias, 2004).
We link our model to behavioral output (in this case,
reaching trajectories) by proposing that motor processes read out the quantity information from either the
location map or summation codes in accordance with
how long the visual information has been available for
processing: Under limited time constraints (such as the
0-ms delay in E1-immediate group), information
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represented in the location map is exclusively used to
guide reaching; under more relaxed time constraints
(such as the 500-ms delay in E1-delay and E2 groups),
reaching can now be inﬂuenced by information
represented at the summation coding stage. Critically,
given evidence from the current study indicating that
motor planning processes do not reﬂect an abstract
(i.e., format independent) representation of numerical
quantity, our model assumes that the content of the
abstract number ﬁeld is never used as a basis for
generating behavior.

Why is the quantity information contained in
small-number nonsymbolic cue displays
available immediately to guide action?
It has been reliably shown from neurophysiological
recordings across a wide variety of brain areas that,
upon the presentation of multiple visual stimuli in the
environment, objects are transiently processed in
parallel and compete for selection before additional
top-down mechanisms select one of them for action
(for reviews, see Cisek, 2007; Cisek & Kalaska, 2010).
This parallel coding of objects rapidly gives rise to a
location map with hills of neural activity at the spatial
position of each object in the visual scene (Fecteau &
Munoz, 2006; Gottlieb, 2002). However, this parallel
individuation of objects, as noted above, has a limited
resource capacity, simultaneously processing only
about four objects in parallel. As shown in the location
maps in Figure 5, when the number of objects on one
side of space is greater than four, only four of those
individual objects (on each side of space) can be
processed in parallel. Thus, even though the actual
display might have more dots on one side of the display
than another (e.g., ﬁve vs. 10), the comparison at the
level of the location map is roughly equivalent (;four
vs. four). Likewise, because the numeral cue displays
only ever contained two separable symbol items on the
screen (one on each side of space), the comparison at
the level of the transient location map is again roughly
equivalent (;one item vs. one item), regardless of the
actual quantities that those numerals denote. Consequently, based on the features of this descriptive model,
when participants are forced to reach towards cue
displays with very little processing time, their reach
plans are informed only by the current information
contained in the transient location map. As such, both
large-number dot displays and numeral displays would
be predicted to show no net trajectory bias toward the
side of the cue display with the higher magnitude,
which is exactly what we observe. In contrast, with a
small-number dot display (less than four items on each
side), each dot competes equally for processing
resources in the location map and thus accounts for the
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observed trajectory biases toward the side of space with
more targets.

Why is more processing time required to extract
large-number nonsymbolic magnitudes?
Here we brieﬂy turn to previous neuronal models of
both magnitude encoding and decision making that
formalize how, when given enough time, signals
conveying magnitude information can arise. In numerical processing models, following the transient
coding of items in a location map, this information is
then summed across the map and stored in what is
referred to as a summation code. These summation
codes are still broadly spatially based (as in the
location map) but importantly now reﬂect aggregated
magnitude information (i.e., a rough count of the
number of objects present, see Dehaene & Changeux,
1993). This summation process is very similar in
principle to the integrative processes thought to
underlie decision making when individuals are presented with two or more competing options to be acted
upon (for reviews, see Cisek & Kalaska, 2010; Gold &
Shadlen, 2007). In decision-making models, the options being considered (which often include decisions
between multiple target locations for eye movements
or reaches) require time for sensory evidence to be
accumulated in favor of one action versus another.
Only after enough time has elapsed such that one
option reaches a sufﬁcient threshold or decision
boundary is there a resultant behavioral output
indicative of the decision (Gold & Shadlen, 2007).
Regardless of the particular type of model employed,
the general ﬁnding is that, given time, these later stages
of processing (e.g., a summation code) can begin to
reﬂect features of the stimulus that are cognitively
removed from those simple ﬁrst visual features
speciﬁcally tied to the objects in space (e.g., those
contained in the location map).With respect to the dot
cue displays in the current study, we suspect that
additional processing time allows either for more
complex visual features to be used in estimating
numerical magnitude (e.g., density, a property requiring the integration of objects over space) or, alternatively, for the summation process to be fully completed
across all items in the display. This, we believe,
explains why large numbers of dots only begin
affecting reach trajectories following a brief delay
period (e.g., 500 ms).
It is also worth noting that, in general, the ﬁnding
that it takes longer to initiate responses with more
options accords with Hick’s Law (whereby simple
choice reaction time scales with the number of choices
available, see Hick, 1952). However, our results differ
from a classical Hick’s ﬁnding in two ways: First, our
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results do not manifest in reaction times (see
Supplemental material for full analysis) but rather in
reach trajectory. We believe this is because we enforce
such a rigid and rapid reaction time deadline (325 ms).
Thus, participants generate rapid responses, and the
type of processing delays that you would usually
expect to ﬁnd in reaction times are pushed into the
movement phase, manifesting as the trajectory deviations we observe. Second, it is not clear if Hick’s law
applies to the rapid enumeration of small sets of items,
or subitizing—the process that we believe guides the
small-dot rapid reach behavior. In general, reaction
times for enumerating small set sizes are fast and
accurate for one to about four objects (Kaufman et
al., 1949; Trick & Pylyshyn, 1994). Beyond four,
however, reaction times for enumeration do scale with
set size, getting longer with more options. It could be
that this scaling in the large number range in part
relies on the same kinds of mechanisms that lead to
Hick’s law.

Why is more processing time, regardless of
number range, required to extract numeral
magnitudes?
With respect to the numeral cue displays in the
current study, we suspect that additional processing
time (e.g., 500-ms delay) allows for a different
process to occur than that noted above; speciﬁcally,
it allows for a learned magnitude association, stored
in an abstract number ﬁeld, to be accessed and then,
based on the features of our model, returned to the
level of the summation code. In the abstract number
ﬁeld (and related representational spaces), the representations of numerosity are divorced from any
analog measure of magnitude, and as such, it is likely
that they are coded only relatively (see Lyons,
Ansari, & Beilock, 2012, for a similar arugment).
That is, while in the abstract number ﬁeld a
magnitude relationship (e.g., greater than) can be
established, this is independent from and not likely
accompanied by any precise notion of the degree of
difference. It may be this highly abstract, more
relational nature of numeral encoding that gives rise
to the winner-take-all trajectory biases we observe. In
contrast, as described above, since the magnitudes of
nonsymbolic dot displays are derived from an actual
physical stimulus dimension that can vary in an
analog fashion (conveyed in both the location map
and summation code), the differences between
increasing magnitudes are necessarily graded (as
observed in the incremental biasing of reach trajectories). (It is critical to note that it is the graded
sensitivity we observe for all dot displays as opposed
to winner-take-all motor responses for all numeral
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displays that gives us conﬁdence that reach trajectories are not generated from the abstract number
ﬁeld.)

Why do small numbers, regardless of format,
generate larger trajectory biases than large
numbers?
At ﬁrst glance, this ﬁnding might appear at odds
with our general result that numerical format has
profound effects on reach planning. However, upon
closer examination, we believe it is the discrepancy
between where motor processes access magnitude
information versus where abstract magnitude information is stored in our model that accounts for this
highly novel and important ﬁnding. As indicated
above, our model proposes that motor actions can
access magnitude information either very early in
processing from the location map (;0 ms delay) or
later in processing from the summation code (; 500 ms
delay), but importantly not from the abstract number
ﬁeld (indeed, if this were the case then we should ﬁnd
no differences between the number formats as they
would both converge upon and be read out from a
common representation). We do recognize, however,
that an abstract number ﬁeld (or some similar type of
representational space) must exist for a numerical
symbol, through either development or learning, to
become associated/linked with a particular magnitude
value derived from real physical properties (indeed, the
abstract number ﬁeld provides an important basis for
neuronal models of symbolic processing, see Verguts &
Fias, 2004), with the magnitude information from
nonsymbolic stimuli (contained in the summation code)
eventually converging onto some type of abstract
number representation. When viewed from this perspective, it would not be particularly surprising then
that small-number numerals should inherit at least
some of the specialized characteristics (e.g., high
precision) of the dedicated mechanisms that support
the individuation of their small-number nonsymbolic
counterparts, as shown here. Indeed, others have even
suggested that symbols are initially grounded only
within the subitizing range and then become abstracted
to encompass larger quantities (Le Corre & Carey,
2007). Concerning debates as to whether number
symbols acquire meaning by being mapped onto
quantity representations supporting the approximate
number system (Gallistel & Gelman, 1992; Piazza et al.,
2007; Verguts & Fias, 2004), thought to support the
representation of all quantities with a precision
governed by Weber’s law, or the parallel individuation
system, already well described above (Carey, 2001,
2009; Piazza, 2010), the interpretation of our behavioral ﬁndings above would suggest that both systems
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are utilized by number symbols (see also Feigenson et
al., 2004; Le Corre & Carey, 2007; Spelke & Kinzler,
2007). Another possibility, however, is that the range
effects observed here for number symbols, rather than
being derived from the nonsymbolic parallel individuation system, instead reﬂect the much higher frequency
with which small number numerals are experienced.
The relatively low frequency with which individuals
interact with symbols of high numerical magnitude is a
cross-cultural and cross-linguistic phenomena (Dehaene & Mehler, 1992) and it is possible that dedicated
(and more precise) neural mechanisms are developed,
through both learning and experience, for dealing with
more frequently encountered symbols and/or stimuli
(e.g., Kobatake, Wang, & Tanaka, 1998; Rainer &
Miller, 2000). Thus, it remains a possibility that the
effect of number range across the two formats may be
underpinned by different processes—in the case of
nonsymbolic quantity it is parallel individuation and in
the case of symbolic quantity it is cultural and linguistic
frequency. In any case, given that the effect of number
range was a between-subjects factor in our study, we
are cautious in making any strong claims concerning
the ﬁndings and future investigations will be required
to disentangle the intriguing possibilities noted above.
Again, it is worth emphasizing that unlike symbolic
numeral information which, in order to be accessed by
the motor system, likely must be fed back onto the
corresponding summation code (or similar type representational spaces), magnitude information derived
from dots can be accessed directly from the summation
code itself. We believe that it is the combination of the
dedicated mechanisms supporting small-number processing (either from parallel individuation or cultural/
linguistic frequency) plus the indirect way in which
numeral information must be accessed by the motor
system that accounts for why both format-dependent
and magnitude-dependent effects can coexist in our
data.
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examined, using a rapid movement task, whether motor
planning processes might reveal unique insights into
how numerical quantities are processed and extracted
for the guidance of visual–motor behavior. We found
that reach planning was inﬂuenced in both a formatdependent and number range-dependent manner and,
rather unexpectedly, that small-number stimuli, regardless of their format, were selectively processed. In
addition to informing investigations and theoretical
frameworks within the ﬁeld of numerical cognition,
these ﬁndings suggest that the use of a visuomotor task
can provide substantive insights into the psychological
mechanisms that support high-level cognitive capabilities in general and the representation of number in
particular.
Keywords: number, symbolic, nonsymbolic, quantity,
movement planning
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Summary
There are vibrant and ongoing debates concerning
the extent to which numerical processing in the brain
(a) is format dependent versus independent (e.g.,
reviewed in Cohen Kadosh & Walsh, 2009) and (b)
relies on a single shared estimation system versus an
additional separate dedicated system for small set sizes
(e.g., reviewed in Piazza, 2010). These debates largely
rest upon discrepancies found in a wide variety of
visual–perceptual tasks in which human participants
either consciously count, compare, track or recall the
numerical magnitudes presented. Here we took a rather
distinct approach to addressing these questions and
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